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Executive Summary 
Decades of neglect and mismanagement have turned Karachi, Pakistan’s largest and 
wealthiest city, into a pressure cooker. Ethno-political and sectarian interests and 
competition, intensified by internal migration, jihadist influx and unchecked move-
ment of weapons, drugs and black money, have created an explosive mix. A heavy-
handed, politicised crackdown by paramilitary Rangers is aggravating the problems. 
To address complex conflict drivers, the state must restore the Sindh police’s author-
ity and operational autonomy while also holding it accountable. Over the longer term, 
it must redress political and economic exclusion, including unequal access to justice, 
jobs and basic goods and services, which criminal and jihadist groups tap for recruits 
and support. It must become again a provider to citizens, not a largely absentee regula-
tor of a marketplace skewed toward the elite and those who can mobilise force. Sindh’s 
ruling party and Karachi’s largest must also agree on basic political behaviour, in-
cluding respect for each other’s mandate, and reverse politicisation of provincial and 
municipal institutions that has eroded impartial governance.  
The megacity’s demographics are at the root of its many conflicts. Every major 
ethnic group has a sizeable presence; economically-driven waves of rural Sindhis, 
Pashtuns, southern Punjabis, those displaced by conflict and natural disasters and 
refugees and illegal immigrants from all over South Asia continue to add to the pop-
ulation. While long term these waves could reconfigure its politics, today’s primary 
divide dates to British India’s 1947 partition and the influx into Karachi of millions 
of Mohajirs (Urdu-speaking migrants from India and their descendants) that re-
duced Sindhis to a minority. In Pakistan’s early years, a predominantly Mohajir 
Muslim League leadership stacked government institutions with its constituents, 
creating Sindhi resentment. In turn, the policies of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan 
Peoples Party (PPP) government, including quotas for under-represented Sindhis in 
government jobs and other institutions, were resented by Mohajirs in the 1970s and 
resulted in violent clashes during the 1980s and 1990s that destabilised provincial 
and national politics.  
With Sindhis now fewer than 10 per cent of Karachi’s population, less than Mo-
hajirs, Pashtuns and Southern Punjabi Seraiki speakers, the contest between the PPP, 
Sindh’s largest party, and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), Karachi’s largest, 
is not primarily electoral but over the nature of the city’s governance. The Sindhi-
dominated PPP has sought to centralise authority in the provincial government as a 
way to control Karachi’s considerable resources; dominant in that city but with lim-
ited electoral prospects beyond the province’s urban centres, the MQM has advocated 
decentralised authority in municipal institutions for the same reason. With both par-
ties politicising the state institutions they control and providing services on partisan 
grounds, Karachi’s citizens lack reliable access to health care, water and affordable 
transport and accommodation. This politicisation has also aggravated ethno-political 
conflict. 
The growing informal economy and privatisation of basic services have opened 
opportunities for exploitive middlemen and mafias. Criminal gangs, to varying degrees 
in collusion with political parties and state authorities, have flourished, including 
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MQM-linked extortion groups and a Baloch-dominated outfit that had PPP patron-
age. Jihadist groups have benefited from a combination of lax law enforcement and 
state support. With sectarian violence again threatening Karachi’s peace, some of the 
country’s most dangerous religious and sectarian groups are actively contesting turf 
and resources, compounding law and order challenges. The predominately Pashtun 
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, Taliban Movement of Pakistan), which estab-
lished a base in the city after military operations against it in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
(KPK) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), is targeting the anti-
militant Pashtun nationalist Awami National Party (ANP) and using force to assert 
its writ.  
The state’s September 2013 response to escalating violence – empowering the 
paramilitary Rangers, who are nominally under the federal interior ministry but in 
practice answer to the military leadership, to operate against jihadist and criminal 
networks – is unlikely to restore peace. Characterised by heavy-handedness and 
human rights violations, including extra-judicial killings, torture and enforced dis-
appearances, it instead breeds ethnic tensions and could boost recruitment to crimi-
nal, including jihadist, networks. The MQM sees it as a partisan attempt to suppress 
the party and pit its Mohajir constituents against each other and competing ethnici-
ties. The PPP, the military’s historic foe, is also in the Rangers’ sights, and its provin-
cial government faces rising pressure to expand the paramilitary unit’s policing powers 
to the rest of Sindh, the party’s political lifeline. Meanwhile, anti-India outfits like the 
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba/Jamaat-ud-Dawa (LeT/JD) and Jaish-e-Mohammed continue to 
operate madrasas and charity fronts with scant reaction from the Rangers or police.  
Tensions are escalating fast, and failure to defuse the impending ethno-political 
crisis and rein in criminal and jihadist networks threatens to sink Pakistan’s most 
important economic centre further into conflict. The PPP and MQM leaderships should 
recognise that their governance failures have opened opportunities for the military’s 
counterproductive intervention in Karachi’s political affairs on the pretext of restor-
ing stability. Reversing the military’s impositions on civilian authority gives them a 
mutual interest in depoliticising and strengthening the police. Sindh’s superior judi-
ciary must also assume its primary responsibility of dispensing justice and protecting 
citizens’ rights.  
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Recommendations 
To achieve the political reconciliation needed so that technical  
fixes are achievable and gains are sustainable 
To Karachi’s political parties: 
1. The PPP, MQM and Awami National Party (ANP) should restart a comprehensive 
dialogue to address Karachi’s political and security challenges, recognising shared 
interests in reviving civilian political space and credibility and creating the condi-
tions in which institutional reforms can be debated, agreed on and implemented.  
2. Reestablish as basic rules of the game respect for each other’s mandate; separation 
of provincial and municipal functions by credible and accountable devolution of 
power; and commitment to deliver provincial and local governance equitably 
rather than on the basis of patronage and exclusion.  
3. Renounce the practice of collaborating with the military to counter political rivals 
and refrain from appealing for military intervention in the city’s internal affairs. 
4. Renounce any current or future alliance with criminal gangs and armed activist 
wings. 
To demonstrate the political will to restore civilian authority, redress  
the adverse consequences of the Rangers’ operation, enforce the rule of  
law in Karachi and prevent renewed criminal and jihadist violence  
To the federal and provincial Sindh governments: 
5. Replace selective counter-terrorism with an approach that targets jihadist groups 
using violence within or from Pakistani territory; regulate the madrasa sector; 
and act comprehensively against those with jihadist links. 
6. End the Rangers’ operation and commit to a law enforcement policy rooted in a 
reformed criminal justice system, including an operationally autonomous but 
accountable police force.  
7. Resist military pressure to renew the Protection of Pakistan Act or grant wide 
powers to military and law enforcement agencies that lend themselves to abuse, 
including 90-day remand without charge; and repeal the 90-day remand provi-
sion in the 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act.  
8. Resist military pressure to renew military courts, the authority of which under 
the 21st constitutional amendment expired in January 2017.  
9. Replace, for the Sindh government, the 1861 Police Act with a new police order, 
using the 2002 Police Order as a template, to guarantee operational autonomy 
and robust internal and external accountability; and abandon plans to give po-
lice recruits military training, instead committing to fundamental reorientation 
of policing toward intelligence gathering, investigation and building court cases. 
10. Investigate all allegations of custodial killings, torture, illegal detention and other 
human rights abuses by any law enforcement/security agency and hold individ-
uals to account. 
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To the Sindh High Court:  
11. Uphold the constitutional right to fair trial by:  
a) prioritising petitions and cases involving alleged human rights abuses and 
denial of due process by law enforcement agencies, including the Rangers; 
and establishing and mandating implementation of practicable investigation 
procedures and fixing individual responsibility in those cases; and  
b) ordering release of anyone detained in violation of basic due process; and 
using such cases as an opportunity to review and strike down any legal provi-
sions that contradict the right to due process and fair trial. 
To the political parties: 
12. Establish funds to support female dependents of party members who have been 
detained, killed, gone missing or are otherwise unable to return to normal life, 
including material and psychological support; and facilitate unimpeded access to 
human rights and other civil society organisations for female dependents and 
family members affected by an operation. 
To address the drivers of conflict, including extreme inequality that  
criminal and jihadist organisations exploit to expand their influence  
To the provincial Sindh government:  
13. Revive and properly resource public housing and public transport projects and 
ensure they benefit lower income groups rather than speculators, mafias and 
other elites, thus reconceiving the concept of land and transportation as a foun-
dation of a peaceful body politic, not simply a market-provided good. 
14. Ensure equal access to basic services, including water and power, for all residents, 
and prevent the Defence Housing Authority (DHA) and elite private real estate 
schemes from unfairly acquiring a disproportionate share.  
15. End illegal regularisation and sale of public land and sale of valuable public agri-
cultural and legally protected property to DHA and any similar public or private 
schemes.  
16. Revive moribund state-run polytechnics, create additional ones and give the pri-
vate sector incentives to establish vocational training institutions. 
Karachi/Islamabad/Brussels, 15 February 2017 
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Pakistan: Stoking the Fire in Karachi 
I. Introduction 
An indiscriminate, opaque crackdown, ostensibly aimed at countering criminality, 
militancy and jihadist violence in Karachi, is increasing ethno-political tensions, 
while failing to curb growth of extremism in the country’s economic hub. The heavy-
handed, highly politicised operation by Rangers, who fall under the interior ministry 
but operate under military command, has targeted but not dented the support base 
of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the megacity’s largest party. Straying 
far from stated goals, the force has also targeted Sindh’s ruling Pakistan Peoples 
Party (PPP), detaining several leaders and straining a fragile democratic transition.1  
In September 2013, with ethno-political tensions, sectarian violence and criminali-
ty escalating in Karachi, the federal and Sindh governments empowered the Rangers 
to operate. They were given special police powers, including shoot-to-kill and to detain 
suspects for 90 days without charge. To be sure, the state’s record in serving and pro-
tecting citizens has historically been poor, but by sidelining Sindh’s regular law en-
forcement system, the Rangers’ operation, like other military-led counter-terrorism 
efforts, has further weakened civilian capacity and deferred the reform process.2  
This report examines the factors responsible for violence and insecurity in Kara-
chi, assesses the impact and effectiveness of the state’s response and explores options 
to contain and prevent renewed conflict and violence. It is based on interviews with 
political leaders, law enforcement and other officials, the legal community, urban 
planners, the media and civil society activists.  
 
 
1 For Crisis Group analysis of civil-military relations, and more specifically the military’s relation-
ship with the MQM and PPP, see Asia Reports N°s 249, Parliament’s Role in Pakistan’s Democratic 
Transition, 18 September 2013; 216, Islamic Parties in Pakistan, 12 December 2011; 102, Authori-
tarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan, 28 September 2005; 77, Devolution in Paki-
stan: Reform or Regression?, 22 March 2004; 49, Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military, 20 
March 2003; and 40, Pakistan: Transition to Democracy, 3 October 2002; also, Asia Briefings N°s 
74, After Bhutto’s Murder: A Way Forward for Pakistan, 2 January 2008; and 43, Pakistan’s Lo-
cal Polls: Shoring Up Military Rule, 22 November 2005.  
2 For Crisis Group analysis of military-led counter-terrorism, see Asia Reports N°s 279, Pakistan’s 
Jihadist Heartland: Southern Punjab, 30 May 2016; 271, Revisiting Counter-Terrorism Strategies 
in Pakistan: Opportunities and Pitfalls, 22 July 2015; 255, Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan, 23 
January 2014; 242, Pakistan: Countering Militancy in PATA, 15 January 2013; 196, Reforming 
Pakistan’s Criminal Justice System, 6 December 2010; 178, Pakistan: Countering Militancy in 
FATA, 21 October 2009; 164, Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge, 13 March 2009; and 157, 
Reforming Pakistan’s Police, 14 July 2008. 
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II. Drivers of Conflict in Karachi  
A. Demographics  
Karachi, Pakistan’s largest city, is divided into six districts, South, East, Central, West, 
Korangi and Malir (each comprising three to four towns), which fall under the city 
administration; and six cantonments administered by military-dominated governing 
bodies and boards. With large Mohajir communities, Karachi Central and East have 
critical MQM strongholds, including North Nazimabad and Gulberg Town, with its 
central headquarters, known as Nine Zero.3 Karachi South, including Lyari town 
with its large Baloch community, has traditionally been a PPP stronghold. Largely 
industrial Karachi West has sizeable pockets of Pashtuns, traditionally constituents 
of the Pashtun nationalist Awami National Party (ANP). The cantonments, mostly in 
the south and centre, have ethnically mixed populations and include some of the 
most affluent neighbourhoods, such as Clifton. The Defence Housing Authority (DHA) 
is autonomous, managed by a military-dominated governing body.4  
The city’s demographics are at the roots of many of its conflicts. Large population 
influxes transformed a small Arabian Sea port of some 435,000 in the early 1940s 
into a megacity of 20-25 million residents, 10-12 per cent of Pakistan’s total and 24 
per cent of its urban population.5 With the migration of millions across new borders 
after the 1947 partition of British colonial India, Karachi’s religious and ethnic con-
figuration changed drastically. With Sindhi Hindus migrating to India, Muslims be-
came 96 per cent of the city’s population by 1951 compared to 42 per cent a decade 
earlier. The massive influx of Mohajirs from India caused the proportion of Sindhis 
to decline from 60 to 14 per cent. By the 1981 census, Sindhi speakers were about 
only 6 per cent of the city, while the numbers of Pashtun and Seraiki-speaking 
Southern Punjabi internal migrants continued to grow.6  
The decision of Pakistan’s founding and first ruling party, the predominately Mo-
hajir Muslim League, to designate Karachi the federal capital (until 1967, when it 
moved to Islamabad), separating it from Sindh province, and to stack government 
institutions with fellow Mohajirs sparked Sindhi resentment. Following Pakistan’s 
dismemberment and Bangladesh’s secession in 1971, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s new PPP 
government appealed to its predominately Sindhi constituents, introducing quotas 
for their under-representation in government jobs and other institutions during the 
decade. Deeply resented by Mohajirs, this widened the ethno-political divide, result-
 
 
3 Urdu-speaking migrants and their descendants are known as Mohajirs (literally, refugees). 
4 Arif Hassan, Noman Ahmed et al., Karachi: The Land Issue (Karachi, 2015).  
5 Laurent Gayer, “A divided city: ‘ethnic’ and ‘religious’ conflicts in Karachi, Pakistan”, Centre de 
Recherches Internationales, Sciences Po, May 2003; Arif Hasan, “Land contestation in Karachi and 
the impact on housing and urban development”, International Institute for Environment and 
Development, April 2015. 
6 Census of Pakistan, Karachi, 1951, vol. 6; 1981 Census Report of Karachi Division, Islamabad, 
1984; also, Mohammad Waseem, “Ethnic conflict in Pakistan: the case of MQM”, The Pakistan 
Development Review, 35:4 part II (Winter 1996). 
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ing in violent Mohajir-Sindhi clashes in the 1980s and 1990s that destabilised national 
as well as provincial politics.7  
Today, Karachi is Pakistan’s economic powerhouse, generating 90 per cent of 
Sindh’s and around 50 per cent of national revenue, attracting new migration from 
every major ethnic and linguistic group across the country. Pashtuns and Punjabis 
are joining its labour force, along with rural to urban migration within Sindh province. 
Adding to Karachi’s population and shaping politics are those displaced by natural 
disasters and conflict, including from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Afghan refugees and illegal migrants from all 
over South Asia.8 
The PPP has won successive provincial elections and headed provincial govern-
ments because of its Sindhi-majority rural constituency, but its electoral standing in 
Karachi has shrunk considerably due to the demographic changes. Though Mohajirs 
remain the largest ethnic group, their relative size is also shrinking, with significant 
implications for the MQM’s long hold on the city. The ANP won its first two provin-
cial assembly constituencies in 2008. In 2013, Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-
Insaf (PTI) became the second largest party, though the MQM has since consolidat-
ed its Mohajir voters in reaction to the Rangers’ actions against it (see below).9  
Rather than becoming a melting pot, Karachi is sharply segregated along ethnic, 
political, and socio-economic lines. Though the city’s diversity could have been con-
structively channelled, the state has pitted ethnic-based groups against each other. 
A labour leader argued: “Violence in Karachi is not a by-product of policy; it is poli-
cy”.10 In particular, the military’s divide-and-rule strategy has often fuelled tensions, 
using the MQM and its Mohajir constituency to undermine the Sindhi-dominated 
PPP and vice versa. These tensions have been further exacerbated by exploitation of 
ethno-political identities by local stakeholders to control the city and its economy 
and have sparked deadly conflict. While ethno-political violence has subsided during 
the current Rangers’ operation, it could resume again given that those fault lines are 
as sharp today as in the past. 
 
 
7 Samina Ahmed, “Centralisation, Authoritarianism, and the Mismanagement of Ethnic Relations 
in Pakistan”, in Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly (eds.), Government Policies and Ethnic Rela-
tions in Asia and the Pacific (Cambridge, Mass., 1997); Charles H. Kennedy, “The politics of ethnic-
ity in Sindh”, Asian Survey, vol. 31, no. 10, October, 1991; also, Crisis Group Report, Authoritarian-
ism and Political Party Reform, op. cit. 
8 During the 2o10 floods, an estimated 500,000 moved to Karachi from elsewhere in Sindh. There 
are also an estimated 1.7 million undocumented migrants mainly from Bangladesh, Myanmar and 
Afghanistan. Hasan, “Land contestation”, op. cit. Also, Crisis Group Asia Report N°237, Pakistan: 
No End to Humanitarian Crises, 9 October 2012. 
9 In Pakistan’s last (1998) census, the percentage of Mohajirs in Karachi had already begun to 
shrunk, to 41 per cent from 54 per cent in the 1988 census. “ECP results show PTI second largest in 
Karachi”, The Express Tribune, 14 May 2013. 
10 Crisis Group interview, Karamat Ali, executive director, Pakistan Institute of Labour Education 
and Research (PILER), Karachi, August 2016. 
Pakistan: Stoking the Fire in Karachi 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°284, 15 February 2017 Page 4 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Who Governs Karachi? 
The PPP-MQM contest is not primarily electoral – the MQM remains by far the city’s 
largest party – but rather over the nature of governance. The PPP, dominant in the 
province, has sought to centralise authority in the Sindh government as a way of con-
trolling Karachi’s considerable resources; the MQM, dominant in the urban centres 
but with limited prospects elsewhere, has advocated decentralised authority in the 
city’s municipal institutions for the same reason.  
General Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime (1977-1988) supported the creation of the 
MQM in the 1980s, using it to counter its main opposition, the PPP, particularly in 
Sindh. In the Karachi context, the close relationship between the military and MQM 
resulted in the party benefitting from Zia’s devolution scheme in the 1980s and a 
subsequent similar effort by General Pervez Musharraf’s regime (1999-2008). Both 
aimed at creating a local clientele to marginalise political opposition toward the mili-
tary, in part by weakening and bypassing provincial institutions, including legisla-
tures.11 With an elected local government enjoying more authority over municipal 
bodies such as the Karachi Port Trust (KPT), Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC) 
and Karachi Development Authority (KDA), the MQM gained significant control 
over city resources and, correspondingly, patronage opportunities. Its government 
discriminated against non-Mohajirs in appointments to these municipal bodies and 
in service provision and development allocations in non-Mohajir areas.12  
By the same token, after Musharraf’s local government system was dissolved by 
PPP’s provincial government and replaced by the Sindh Local Government Act 2013, 
funds often were not transferred to municipal bodies such as the KMC.13 In the cur-
rent dispensation, local government institutions, traditionally controlled by the MQM, 
have been weakened, and the PPP-dominated Sindh provincial assembly has passed 
laws transferring many revenue-generating tasks to provincially controlled boards, 
thus empowering provincial representatives and bureaucrats in a zero sum contest 
against municipal counterparts.14  
 
 
11 Crisis Group Asia Reports, Devolution in Pakistan, op. cit.; N°137, Elections, Democracy and Sta-
bility in Pakistan, 31 July 2007; also, Dr Nausheen H. Anwar (lead author), “Urbanisation, gender 
& violence: a scoping study”, co-funded Safe and Inclusive Cities project, Canadian International De-
velopment Research Centre, UK Department of International Development (DFID), February 2014.  
12 Crisis Group Report, Policing Urban Violence, op. cit. 
13 Noman Ahmed, “Micromanaging Karachi”, Dawn, 8 November 2016. 
14 Large infrastructure projects have been transferred to provincial departments. For example, the 
Sindh High Density Board Act (2010, amended 2013), and the Sindh Special Development Board 
Act (2014), are non-elected boards under the chief minister that empower provincial representa-
tives and bureaucrats to approve/undertake major city projects, including high rises, with limited 
consultation with urban and town planners or studies and planning – flaws concerned profession-
als acknowledge. In 2016, the Sindh planning and development department assigned the education 
department three projects for developing natural creeks in Gadap Town and New Karachi, envi-
sioned for the KMC. Informed observers believe this was done to ensure provincial government 
control over the funds, in anticipation of MQM control of the KMC after the 2016 local elections. 
Crisis Group interviews, Karachi, July-August 2016. Mahim Maher, “Debate: where does Karachi 
need more high-rise buildings?”, The Express Tribune, 22 September 2014; “Review of high-rise 
building laws sought”, Dawn, 6 July 2014.  
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Though elected local bodies are in place after the 2016 polls, they have limited 
control over municipal affairs. “Slowly, the concept of Karachi as a city government 
has ceased to be”, said Arif Hassan, a prominent architect involved in urban planning. 
The marginalisation of municipal bodies, political interference and sidelining of gov-
ernment agencies are eroding services. With the gradual privatisation over several 
years of transport, water, public housing and power, the state’s role has receded from a 
service provider and facilitator to that of a largely absent regulator. “Given the sums 
involved, can the state be an effective regulator”, Hassan asked, “it’s doubtful. They’ll 
continue to give in to contractors’ demands”.15  
The privatisation of the Karachi Electric Supply Company (KESC) in 2005, the 
city’s sole official power supplier, has led to price increases that make electricity un-
affordable for lower income groups and aggravate power theft.16 Even health care 
has fallen victim to the political jockeying. During their intense conflict after the 
2008 elections, the ANP and MQM used their respective control over hospitals to 
distribute it as a favour to constituents.17 The absence of a state-provided ambulance 
service is largely filled by credible social welfare entities like the Edhi Foundation but 
also gives opportunities for the charity fronts of jihadist organisations such as the 
Falah-i-Insaniyat Foundation (FIF) of the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT, renamed Jamaat-
ud-Dawa, JD).18 Public transport and social housing are virtually non-existent; resi-
dents even depend on private tankers for water.  
With the Sindh government unable to manage rapid population growth, lower-
income groups depend on middlemen, not the state, for basic services, but control 
over these lucrative sectors is secured by force, money and official collusion. With 
corruption allowing flagrant disregard for rules and regulations, a large informal 
sector has annexed significant parts of the economy, leading to the growth of mafias 
and rackets. With large textile and manufacturing sectors and financial services, Ka-
rachi accounts for some half of national revenue, but it also generates a yearly black 
economy estimated at $2.9 billion, including via land, water and transport mafias, 
illegal gambling, human trafficking and kidnapping. Its formal economy generates 
20-25 per cent of national GDP, almost $290 billion in 2014-2015, according to 
Sindh government figures. The city also accounted for much of Sindh’s some $85.5 
billion 2014- 2015 GDP and is the source of 54 per cent of central government tax 
revenue.19 As a major port, Karachi is also “a strategic hub for the Afghan heroin 
trade … and an entry point for arms and munitions destined for Afghanistan”.20 
 
 
15 Crisis Group interview, Karachi, July 2016. 
16 KESC was privatised in 2005, with the new management of K-Electric taking over in 2008. See, 
www.ke.com.pk. 
17 Laurent Gayer, Karachi: Ordered Disorder and the Struggle for the City (Oxford, 2014). 
18 “JuD charity launches ambulance service in Karachi”, Dawn, 27 January 2015. 
19 Karachi contributes close to 96 per cent of Sindh’s tax revenues. “Budget strategy paper: 2016-17 
to 2017-18”, Finance Department, Government of Sindh, February 2016; Gayer, Karachi: Ordered 
Disorder, op. cit., p. 5; S. Akbar Zaidi, “Karachi as a province”, Dawn, 11 January 2014. 
20 Noman Ahmed, Donald Brown, et al., “Public and private control and contestation of public 
space amid violent conflict in Karachi”, working paper, International Institute for Environment and 
Development, November 2015. Upon release of the 2016 annual UN Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) “World Drug Report 2016”, UNODC’s Pakistan country representative described Karachi 
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C. The Challenges of Population Density and Urban Growth 
Continued population growth and increasing density have long undermined the 
capacity of an under-resourced city administration to provide security, shelter and 
other basic services, including health, education and transport. Some 70 per cent of 
Karachi residents are poor; given rapid, unplanned growth, half the population lives 
in squatter settlements (katchi abadis), first developed in the 1950s when officials 
and middlemen seized and sold provincial Board of Revenue land to low-income fami-
lies at affordable prices.21 With much of the land allocated for residential use either 
undeveloped, bought by speculators and left vacant or seized by armed gangs, devel-
opment plans have largely failed to distribute it to the urban poor.22 
Despite ill-defined and expanding borders, the city centre is still at the heart of 
industry and livelihood opportunities. Efforts to produce self-sustained satellite towns, 
for example North Karachi and Landhi-Korangi in the late 1950s, have failed to achieve 
desired results, since envisioned industrial bases did not materialise.  
Housing and transport problems are especially acute for women, whose numbers 
are increasing in the informal labour force, particularly as house help, and in the 
manufacturing sector.23 Working women reportedly spend four hours daily commut-
ing in unsafe conditions. “Women’s Only” sections in buses are seldom enforced, and 
police typically ignore complaints about sexual harassment.24 Leaving home early, 
travelling long distances and returning at night to unsafe neighbourhoods, they face 
threats and harassment. Even non-Muslims have started wearing the burqa (veil) as 
protection against harassment. Many home-based women workers complain about 
social isolation in the absence of safe, convenient transport.25  
With 24,000 people per sq. km., Karachi is one of the world’s most densely popu-
lated cities.26 Given the choice, low-income groups do not opt for housing in the less 
dense outskirts, which involve additional costs, including transport, and add hours 
to work commutes. They prefer irregular settlements closer to the densely-populated 
city centre. Many irregular settlements, often high-rises run on informal rental ar-
rangements, have become sanctuaries for criminality, gang recruitment and jihadist 
groups. The crowded spaces also create a “dependency towards various kinds of 
middlemen, the police and local politicians who navigate the murky waters between 
 
 
as “the largest transit hub” of Afghanistan-sourced opiates. “UNODC report: Pakistan risks becom-
ing drugs-consuming country”, The Express Tribune, 25 August 2016.  
21 Pakistan’s methodology for measuring poverty, beyond food energy intake, includes expenditures 
on education, health and mobile connectivity. Mubarik Zeb Khan, “New poverty line makes a third 
of Pakistanis poor”, Dawn, 8 April 2016. 
22 Hasan, “Land contestation”, op. cit. Many katchi abadis developed on the roads linking new 
neighbourhoods to the centre. In 1978, the Katchi Abadi Act, recognising that over half the city’s 
population lived in such informal settlements, regularised 89 per cent of all katchi abadis estab-
lished before its enactment and extended the cut-off date to late 1997. Karachi’s expansion has tak-
en place essentially on provincial Board of Revenue agricultural and pasture lands. 
23 “Denial and discrimination: labour rights in Pakistan”, PILER, 2007; “Karachi: home-based 
workers being exploited by middlemen”, Dawn, 24 September 2009.  
24 “Responding to the transport crisis”, working paper, The Urban Resource Centre, July 2015. 
25 Crisis Group interviews, women’s rights and other civil society activists, Karachi, May-October 
2016.  
26 Hasan, “Land contestation”, op. cit. 
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the official and the unofficial economy”.27 In the absence of subsidised housing and 
with prices constantly rising, even middle class families are increasingly unable to 
afford property. In contrast, the elite benefit from large housing schemes and gated 
communities that take land from small townships and villages and appropriate water 
and other scant resources intended for broader public distribution.28 
Public land has commonly been illegally regularised and sold. In the process, it 
has become the city’s most prized and contested commodity, with federal, provincial 
and local land-owning agencies, military cantonments, corporate entities and formal 
and informal developers competing to extract as much value as possible.29 Given the 
fiscal stakes, disputes are settled by bribery and political, bureaucratic and police 
patronage, and even deadly force. To protect themselves and their investments, 
owners are often reluctant to rent to those of another ethnic, sectarian or religious 
group, thus resulting in exclusive urban enclaves.30  
The military is one of the biggest real-estate stakeholders; officers obtain valuable 
agricultural land for nominal sums and become “absentee landlords” as they engage in 
speculation, a litigation lawyer said.31 An eighth phase (residential project) of the mili-
tary-run Defence Housing Authority (DHA) is currently being built with barbed wire 
and surveillance cameras. DHA intends to incorporate valuable, legally-protected 
mangrove forests along the Gizri Creek, with 13,000 acres allotted for two more 
phases.32 A senior academic and urban planner described housing developments like 
the DHA and private Bahria Town scheme as “the expropriation of resources by the 
elite … super-imposed on rather than integrated” into Karachi’s body politic.33  
Public transport, which used to include affordable buses, trams and a circular 
railway that allowed easy travel, including to industrial areas, is now largely defunct; 
efforts to revive it, including 2012 plans for a mass transit system, have yet to bear 
fruit. Private transport has filled the vacuum. An umbrella entity, Transport Ittehad 
(Unity), protects transporters’ commercial interests, negotiating fares with the state. 
Given this virtual monopoly, fares have more than doubled since 2009. Control over 
transport became all the more lucrative after the 2001 U.S.-led intervention in Afghan-
istan, since the NATO supply route goes through Karachi’s port.34 
 
 
27 Gayer, Karachi: Ordered Disorder, op. cit.  
28 Haseeb Asif, “What lies behind the gates of Pakistan’s elite communities?”, Herald, July 2016; 
“Bahria Town Karachi: greed unlimited”, Dawn, 18 April 2016. 
29 Hassan, Ahmed et al., Karachi, op. cit. 
30 Hasan, “Land contestation”, op. cit. 
31 Crisis Group interview, Karachi, August 2016. 
32 Crisis Group observations and interviews, retired and serving officials, litigators and urban plan-
ners, Karachi, July-August 2016. “Karachi: a goldmine for land ‘developers’”, Dawn, 18 April 2016. 
DHA is an autonomous real estate cooperative society, with real estate development rights and es-
tablished during the Zia military regime in the 1980s, replacing the Pakistan Defense Officers’ Co-
operative Housing Society. It is managed by a military-dominated governing body and executive 
board. The Clifton cantonment oversees its functioning. See Hassan, Ahmed et al., Karachi, op. cit. 
33 Crisis Group interview, Noman Ahmed, chairman, department of architecture and planning, 
NED University of Engineering and Technology, Karachi, August 2016.  
34 “This organisation [Transport Ittehad] protects the commercial interests of the transporters and 
through it they present their claims and guard their gains, and negotiate the rate of informal pay-
ments they have to make to a corrupt police force”. “Responding to the transport crisis in Karachi”, 
op. cit. Transport Ittehad was able to gain significant influence in related sectors such as informal 
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III. Ethno-political Conflict, Criminality and  
Jihadist Expansion  
Though Mohajir-Sindhi violence had subsided considerably since the 1990s, other 
already high ethno-political violence, including between Mohajirs and particularly 
Pashtuns, but also the Baloch, rose sharply after the 2008 elections.35 With it threat-
ening to spiral out of control in June-July 2011, the PPP, MQM and ANP negotiated 
agreements abjuring violent politics, condemning targeted killings and adopting 
measures such as neighbourhood committees.36 However, these failed to keep the 
peace. The ANP accused the MQM of continuing violence; MQM leaders said they 
could not restrain party activists from avenging ANP or ANP-backed attacks.37  
New entrants complicated Karachi’s ethno-political conflict. After military opera-
tions beginning in 2009 in KPK’s Swat region and FATA’s South Waziristan agency, 
the predominately Pashtun Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, Taliban Movement of 
Pakistan) established a Karachi base. Many TTP militants relocated and violently 
challenged the anti-militant ANP in Pashtun neighbourhoods such as SITE (Sindh 
Industrial Trading Estate), Qasba Colony and elsewhere. The People’s Aman (Peace) 
Committee (PAC), a Baloch-dominated criminal gang, emerged in Lyari in 2008, 
supported by the PPP, particularly Sindh’s then home minister, Zulfiqar Mirza, to 
counter MQM-backed Mohajir gangs that had earlier, with Musharraf regime sup-
port, undermined PPP influence in its traditional constituency. The new players dis-
rupted Karachi’s “ordered disorder”.38 “Before then, the frontiers [were] defined”, 
said a Karachi journalist. “A party used to have its flag in an area, … and that was 
large[ly] respected. But the TTP and PAC had no geographic limits”.39 Extortion, 
once mainly MQM-identified, multiplied and became increasingly violent. 
The conflict’s impact was also devastating for women, indirect victims who lost 
husbands, sons and other close male relatives who were often the main wage earn-
ers, thus incurring new financial and associated social pressures. In Lyari, women 
were also caught in the crossfire between gangs and subjected to violence to settle 
vendettas against male rivals. Gang takeovers of neighbourhoods and the mass flight 
of male relatives undermined female security, including increased risk of rape and 
other forms of violence, well documented in Lyari’s Christian neighbourhood known 
as “Slaughter House”.40 Women seldom receive justice in such cases; police and courts 
 
 
land development along the northern bypass, which links Karachi West to Malir cantonment in the 
east, where it meets the Super Highway to Hyderabad district. It bypasses the congested Karachi 
South and Central districts. Crisis Group interviews, senior Sindh officials, Karachi, August 2016. 
Subuk Hasnain, “Mass movement: Karachi’s public transport woes”, Herald, June 2016; also, KPTS 
website, www.sindh.gov.pk/dpt/Transport/kpts.html. 
35 By 2010, targeted and tit-for-tat killings of MQM and ANP workers soon outpaced those between 
other parties. Crisis Group Report, Policing Urban Violence, op. cit. 
36 “MQM, ANP agree to form peace bodies”, Dawn, 14 June 2011. 
37 Crisis Group interviews, ANP, MQM leaders, Karachi, Islamabad, July-August 2016. 
38 Gayer, Karachi, op. cit. Crisis Group Report, Policing Urban Violence, op. cit. 
39 Crisis Group interview, Karachi, July 2016. 
40 Crisis Group interviews, human rights activists, Karachi, July-August 2016; telephone interviews, 
women’s rights activists, October 2016; also, “Migrating out: Lyari forces its Christian residents to 
move out”, The Express Tribune, 10 November 2013. 
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commonly fail to take up cases of sexual violence, instead blaming the victim.41 In 
some cases, women whose male relatives had been killed, arrested, or forced under-
ground assumed responsibility to defend their households, even taking up arms.42  
By 2013, the TTP threat had grown considerably, with an estimated 8,000 mem-
bers operating in the city. Forcibly acquiring land for supporters and sympathisers, 
they drove residents out of strongholds in Karachi West and Malir. TTP factions 
hired local criminals to help finance their activities, who in turn leveraged TTP links 
against rivals. Karachi thus changed from a city in which jihadist combatants mainly 
rested and recuperated from fighting elsewhere to one that also generated vital fund-
ing. TTP-run extortion rackets, for instance, targeted marble factory owners in strong-
holds such as Manghopir, while kidnapping for ransom and robberies generated 
additional revenue. The police were regularly attacked, bans were enforced on “im-
moral activities” and “peace committees” (mobile courts and jirgas – councils of 
elders) were established to win over constituents and consolidate local authority.43  
The TTP is the latest addition to the explosive jihadist mix. Pakistan’s most dan-
gerous groups actively contest Karachi’s turf and resources. The anti-Shia Lashkar-
e-Jhangvi and anti-India LeT/JD and Jaish-e-Mohammed have umbilical links with 
the city’s large, well-resourced madrasas. With its large Shia population, sectarian 
conflict nationwide typically echoes in Karachi. In 2012, as sectarian tensions spiked 
across Pakistan, there were over 100 sectarian killings in the city, up 350 per cent in 
a year. 2013 was equally bloody.44  
With constituency politics increasingly subsumed by gang and jihadist violence, 
the mainstream political players saw their authority eroded in key strongholds. By 
the 2013 elections, when the PAC even selected PPP electoral candidates in Lyari, an 
analyst noted, “the balance of power between the PPP leadership and [the PAC] had 
been reversed”.45 The ANP was weakened even more, as TTP militants attacked and 
killed party workers and supporters, prompting many to flee; many homes in the 
 
 
41 War Against Rape, a respected Karachi-based civil society organisation, has extensively docu-
mented such cases. www.war.org.pk. “Women’s Access to Justice in Pakistan”, working paper sub-
mitted to the Committee on Women’s Access to Justice at its 54th session, on behalf of the War 
Against Rape and Aurat Foundation, 2013. Also, Crisis Group Asia Report N°265, Women, Violence 
and Conflict in Pakistan, 8 April 2015. 
42 Crisis Group telephone interview, Zohra Yusuf, chairperson, Human Rights Commission of Paki-
stan (HRCP), October 2016. “HRCP slams horrors in Karachi turf wars”, press release, 9 January 
2014; “‘They’ are after the women of Lyari”, The Friday Times, 2-8 August 2012. 
43 Gayer, Karachi, op. cit.  
44 Estimates of Karachi’s Shia population range between 20 to 30 per cent. Attacks on Shias includ-
ed one on 2 March 2013 in predominately Shia Abbas Town that killed 40; clashes 4-6 November, 
just before the start of Muharram, that claimed the lives of seventeen Shias and Sunnis; and at least 
thirteen killed in sectarian attacks on 3 December, including the deputy secretary general of the 
Shia party Majlis-e-Wahdutul Muslimeen (MWM). Sectarian outfits also targeted senior MQM 
members, killing two pro-Shia provincial lawmakers in 2010 and 2013. Crisis Group Reports, Polic-
ing Urban Violence and Pakistan: Karachi’s Madrasas and Violent Extremism, both op. cit. Also, 
Andreas Rieck, The Shias of Pakistan: An Assertive and Beleaguered Minority (New York, 2015), 
p. 78; and Nadeem F. Paracha, “Karachi: The past is another country”, Dawn, 25 August 2011. 
45 Gayer, Karachi, op. cit.  
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ANP’s Qasba Colony stronghold are still abandoned. By the end of the 2013 campaign, 
the TTP had forced the ANP to close 70 per cent of its offices in the city.46  
 
 
46 Ibid. Crisis Group observations and interviews, civil society representatives and residents, Qasba 
Colony, Karachi, July-August 2016.  
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IV. The State’s Response: The Rangers’ Operations 
A. The Premise 
While sharply deteriorating security necessitated a robust law enforcement response, 
a brutal and unaccountable paramilitary operation was not the solution or the only 
alternative. Under an operationally autonomous but accountable leadership, the 
Sindh police would have been the appropriate institution to lead the effort to restore 
basic law and order. The provincial government’s failure to depoliticise and empower 
the police and political parties’ failure to restrain violent party activists shrank the 
space to formulate a credible response.  
By late 2013, the Sindh government’s inability to rein in crime – killings that Au-
gust averaged around nine per day – accentuated by the continued politicisation of 
senior police appointments that undermined the force’s morale and effectiveness, gave 
the military and Rangers an opportunity to intervene.47 On 4 September, the federal 
cabinet approved a Rangers-led operation, ostensibly under Sindh government super-
vision, against violence and criminality in Karachi. The Rangers were to focus on four 
areas: terrorism, targeted killings, kidnapping for ransom and extortion.48 Under the 
Protection of Pakistan Ordinance, 2013, made law under the Protection of Pakistan 
Act, 2014, and amendments to the 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act, the Rangers were au-
thorised, with few constraints, to detain suspects for 90 days without charge and to 
shoot-to-kill suspected terrorists.49  
Four committees, including a citizen’s body, were supposed to oversee facets of 
the operation. While these were either never formed or remain inactive, the Rangers’ 
mandate has been extended several times, for periods ranging from three months to 
a year, most recently in January 2017. These repeated extensions undercut a basic 
premise for use of a paramilitary force to address law-and order challenges, namely 
a short timeframe with clearly defined objectives. This operation’s duration not only 
appears open-ended, but there is also rising pressure on the provincial government 
to extend its jurisdiction beyond Karachi to the rest of Sindh province.50 
The results after more than three years are at best mixed. Street crime persists at 
its previously high rate, as acknowledged by Sindh’s chief minister, who directed the 
police to prioritise eradicating it in January 2017.51 In July 2016, Sindh’s counter-
terrorism department (CTD) released data showing a rise in kidnapping cases and 
 
 
47 In the run-up to the May 2013 elections, Karachi saw the transfers and appointments of four po-
lice superintendents in two days. Inspector generals (IGs) for Karachi were also replaced in 2013 
and 2014 on tenuous grounds. See Crisis Group Reports, Policing Urban Violence and Revisiting 
Counter-Terrorism Strategies, both op. cit. 
48 “Nisar says Karachi ‘operation’ to start in two days”, Dawn, 5 September 2013. 
49 Protection of Pakistan Act (2014); and Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act (2014), Act no. VI 
(2014). The Protection of Pakistan Act was signed into law in July 2014 to “provide for protection 
against waging of war or insurrection against Pakistan and the prevention of acts threatening the 
security of Pakistan”. It granted wide powers and discretion to security agencies, including military 
and paramilitary forces. Crisis Group Report, Revisiting Counter-Terrorism Strategies, op. cit. 
50 “Centre, Sindh at loggerheads over Rangers’ special powers”, Dawn, 3 August 2016; “Rangers 
power extended for 90 days in Karachi”, The News, 20 January 2017. 
51 “CM Shah directs AD Khawaja to eradicate Karachi street crime on priority basis”, Dawn, 2 Jan-
uary 2017. 
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gang rapes in Karachi and elsewhere in Sindh in the first half of the year compared 
to the same period in 2015. By several credible accounts, some crimes, including tar-
geted killings and extortion, have dropped markedly. Yet, Karachi is still the most 
violent city in the country, with 476 terrorism and militancy-related deaths in 2016.52  
A senior police officer said the Rangers operation had “busted some of [the] myths 
about Karachi, such as ‘no-go areas’”, but he criticised the Rangers for the opera-
tion’s increasing politicisation and human rights abuses, concerns also voiced by po-
litical parties, the human rights community and civil society more generally.53 “With 
coercive powers, arrests go up, encounter killings [staged by law-enforcement agen-
cies] go up, and crime gets dispersed”, said another senior Sindh police officer. Police 
believe jihadist operatives and criminal gang members have gone underground to 
form sleeper cells, while better-known masterminds and facilitators fled to other 
provinces before the operation began.54 Saleem Aleemuddin, joint director of the 
Orangi Pilot Project (OPP), who was injured and four of whose colleagues were killed 
by a January 2014 bomb, said, “we were able to move back to Qasba Colony in Feb-
ruary … because we heard the situation has improved. But we’re still tense, because 
we have no idea if the outfits after us have been dismantled or only temporarily dis-
placed, or their supporters are still around”.55 
The overall decline of organised violence is not surprising; the army and Rangers 
operation in Karachi against MQM in the 1990s had the same results.56 Its gains 
were not sustainable. It not only failed to address the underlying political dynamics, 
but it also fed those very ethnic tensions and resentments; it ultimately did not curb 
violence, as criminal, including extortionist, and jihadist networks reconstituted and 
multiplied.57 History may now repeat itself.  
The forces’ powers have expanded considerably, notably to detain suspects for 90 
days, which a lawyer who has represented the Rangers in court described as “a crime 
 
 
52 “Karachi still most violent city: report”, The Express Tribune, 7 January 2017; Hafiz Tunio, “Ka-
rachi law and order: Rangers to launch operation in two days”, The Express Tribune, 5 September 
2013; “Killings drop but kidnappings, gang rape and riots on the rise”, Dawn, 28 July 2016.  
53 Crisis Group interview, Karachi, July 2016. According to one explanation of “no-go areas”: “Based 
on your ethnicity, sect or political leaning, there are certain areas you cannot enter, or would enter 
at your own risk, or areas that you would avoid for the fear of getting struck, mugged, or kidnapped 
for ransom”. “Karachi notebook: no more no-go areas”, Dawn, 19 April 2015. Also, “Human rights 
violations in Karachi”, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), 4 October 2016; “Karachi 
action mustn’t undermine due process, right to criticize institutions: HRCP”, 28 July 2015; “Paki-
stan: Independently investigate Aftab Ahmad’s death: Pakistan Rangers should be held accountable 
for abuses”, Human Rights Watch, 6 May 2016; “Rangers controversy”, editorial, Daily Times, 15 
December 2015. 
54 Crisis Group interviews, police officials, Karachi, July-August 2016. 
55 Crisis Group interview, Qasba Colony, Karachi, 3 August 2016. The NGO-led OPP works on social 
development, health, housing, education and micro-credit in Orangi Town’s kachi abadis.  
56 Altaf Hussain, a leader and founding member of the All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organisation 
(APMSO) in Karachi, launched the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (Mohajir National Movement) in 
1984; its name changed to Muttahida Qaumi Movement (United National Movement) in 1997. In 
the early 1990s, when the government moved against it in Karachi, Hussain sought exile in London 
and acquired UK citizenship. “Politics and exile: the story of Altaf Hussain”, Dawn, 3 June 2014. 
57 Crisis Group Reports, Policing Urban Violence; The Militant Jihadi Challenge, both op. cit. 
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against humanity”.58 Instead of confining themselves to the four-point mandate, the 
Rangers are intruding into such areas as anti-corruption, using the justification that 
it is intrinsically tied to terrorism. A former director general of the Federal Investi-
gation Agency (FIA), the law enforcement body with primary jurisdiction over cor-
ruption investigations and money laundering, asked: “What capacity do the Rangers 
have to investigate white collar crime?”59 Such powers should be viewed in the con-
text of a broader national shift toward an opaque, militarised justice system with 
military courts that contravene the constitutional right to fair trial. The operation 
should also be examined in light of the post-December 2014 counter-terrorism 
National Action Plan, which expanded the military’s role in formulating and imple-
menting internal security policy at the expense not only of elected representatives 
and civilian institutions, but also of fundamental constitutional principles.60  
Gauging public sentiment is hard; those who support the Rangers’ mandate, such 
as the business community that is freed from extortion, can do so publicly without 
fear of reprisal, while those adversely affected by abuse of power are “too scared to 
mobilise”. Yet, with victims of abuses and/or their families filing court petitions di-
rectly or through the independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), 
the operation’s costs on Karachi’s polity and society are increasingly apparent.61  
B. Absence of Due Process 
As the operation’s scope has grown, so have human rights violations. Suspects are 
commonly not produced in court within the constitutionally-stipulated 24 hours. 
“Whoever the Rangers now arrest, they will typically keep for the 90 days”, said a 
senior lawyer and Supreme Court Bar Association ex-president.62 Total arrests are 
uncertain, since multiple agencies have arrest powers, many are released without 
charge, and there is no accounting of those illegally apprehended, whom security and 
law enforcement agencies deny holding. Estimates range from 6,000 to over 10,000.63 
While habeas corpus petitions often result in judges summoning Rangers or other 
security agency representatives, they deny knowledge, and the courts are unwilling 
to pursue matters further. Yet, judges have the authority to call officials to account 
for missing citizens, as they did in 2006-2007, when such cases in the superior 
courts implicated the military’s intelligence agencies in the enforced disappearances 
of hundreds, possibly thousands, in Balochistan, KPK (then the Northwest Frontier 
Province), FATA and elsewhere. Unwilling to accept denials of responsibility, judges 
demanded that security agencies establish missing persons’ whereabouts, whether or 
not they were in custody.64 In Karachi, the general inertia of the judiciary, including 
 
 
58 Crisis Group interview, July 2016. 
59 Crisis Group interview, August 2016. “Billions of black money being used to fund terrorism in 
Karachi: Rangers chief”, Dawn, 12 June 2015. 
60 Crisis Group Report, Revisiting Counter-Terrorism Strategies, op. cit. 
61 Crisis Group interview, Zohra Yusuf, HRCP chairperson, Karachi, August 2016. 
62 Crisis Group interview, Yasin Azad, Karachi, August 2016. 
63 “Rights meeting: Senate panel ‘dismayed’ by absence of top officials”, The Express Tribune, 24 
September 2016; “Karachi operation: Rangers stand as an anti-terror bulwark”, The Express Trib-
une, 19 December 2015. 
64 Crisis Group Report, Reforming Pakistan’s Judiciary, op. cit. 
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the Sindh High Court (SHC), undermines prospects of holding Rangers personnel 
accountable, including for crimes as grave as extrajudicial killing.65  
The vast majority of detainees are eventually released, but with credible evidence 
of various degrees of torture and other ill-treatment.66 This is so even in high profile 
cases such as that of Dr Asim Hussain, ex-petroleum minister and chair of the Dr 
Ziauddin Group of Hospitals. A close aide of President Asif Zardari in the 2008-2013 
PPP government, he was arrested in August 2015 and charged with terrorist financ-
ing, corruption and providing medical services to terrorists. A health board estab-
lished to assess his physical and mental condition determined that he suffered from 
extreme trauma, stress and fear. “If a major public figure like that can break down, 
imagine what it’s like for ordinary people”, said HRCP chairperson Zohra Yusuf.67  
Many women approach the courts and organisations like HRCP to register the 
arrest, disappearance or killing of male relatives. Yet, women often find it difficult to 
access formal legal channels, not least because of the high costs and their loss of the 
household’s main wage earner. The MQM, which gives them little financial help, 
should establish a party fund for the purpose. Rights activists also complain that it 
insists on having party representatives present in civil society consultations with 
such women, adding to the challenge of obtaining detailed, accurate information.68  
The bodies of at least 70 MQM male activists have been discovered since the start 
of the operation, and the party says over 125 men are missing.69 “For the Rangers, 
it’s a numbers game: the more killed, the better, so they’ll target not just the suspect 
but also whatever companions he has around him”, said an experienced crime re-
porter. An MQM worker reportedly apprehended by the Rangers on 1 May 2016 was 
found dead two days later. Though the Rangers’ Sindh director general admitted that 
Rangers personnel had tortured him, and the then-army chief, General Raheel Sha-
rif, pledged an investigation, there has been no progress thus far.70  
Human rights lawyers say inquiries into alleged custodial killings are hampered 
by convoluted, protracted procedures, including exhumations, post mortems and 
jurisdictional disputes between state institutions that “add up to a mockery of the 
justice system”. Many young Mohajir men have fled homes in MQM bastions like 
 
 
65 Senior police officials provided Crisis Group mobile phone video footage of several extrajudicial 
killings, Karachi, August 2016.  
66 According to Human Rights Watch, the Rangers “have been implicated in serious rights abuses, 
including torture and other ill-treatment of criminal suspects, extrajudicial killings and enforced 
disappearances”. “Independently investigate Aftab Ahmad’s death”. Pakistan’s HRCP noted that 
“cases of extrajudicial killings and torture continue to be reported”. “Human rights violations”; also 
“Independently investigate Aftab Ahmad’s death”, both op. cit. 
67 Crisis Group interview, Karachi, August 2016. 
68 Crisis Group telephone interviews, Karachi-based human and women’s rights activists, October 
2016.  
69 Crisis Group interviews, MQM leadership and HRCP, Karachi, July-August 2016. Crisis Group 
has received but not independently verified extensive documentation of missing persons from the 
MQM and human rights lawyers.  
70 Crisis Group interview, Karachi, August 2016. “DG Rangers admits deceased MQM worker was 
tortured during custody”, Dawn, 4 May 2016. 
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Azizabad, fearing arrest because of party association due to their ethnicity or rela-
tive’s MQM affiliation. In some cases, they have relocated as far away as Islamabad.71 
In the absence of an organised effort, like the MQM’s, to record and present cases 
of affected party workers to courts or the public, there is little accounting of Pash-
tuns and Baloch who have been killed or who have disappeared in the operation. 
Collective punishment and guilt by association appear to have become standard 
practice. According to a rights activist:  
If a Baloch youth with no criminal record is killed in Lyari, [the Rangers or po-
lice] will say he was a Lyari gang member. If a Pashtun is killed, they’ll say he was 
Taliban. If it is a Seraiki-speaker [from southern Punjab], they’ll say he belonged 
to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Every time, the story is similar: ‘We showed up at this 
hideout, there was a shootout, and this many people were killed’.72 
Just as when gangs displaced families from Lyari and elsewhere, displacement caused 
by the Rangers also exposes women to sexual and other violence. Anecdotal accounts 
abound of harassment of women in neighbourhoods such as Lyari, where paramili-
tary units maintain a prominent presence; women there from the ethnic Katchi 
community complain of abrasiveness and provocation on their way to work from 
Rangers personnel.73  
The operation also appears to have encouraged police excesses. “If you’re poor 
and suspected of being a criminal, [the police] will shoot you”, said a crime branch 
officer.74 Some police appear eager to curry favour with the Rangers and military. 
In an April 2015 press conference, a senior superintendent alleged that the MQM 
had been sending activists to India for training by the Indian intelligence agency, 
Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), and recommended the party’s banning. The 
same official said his force had killed 50 people in “encounters’” between October 
2014 and April 2015. Senior police have allegedly offered cash rewards to personnel 
involved in extrajudicial killings.75 With the mushrooming of kachi abadis around 
graveyards, residents have become more aware of and affected by “encounter” kill-
ings. A resident of Zia Colony reportedly said: 
Whenever the sirens of police mobile vehicles and ambulances are heard, we 
know that handcuffed militants have been brought to the graveyard. They will be 
killed and then taken by the ambulances to a hospital or morgue. Fifteen minutes 
after that, there will be tickers on news channels of an alleged encounter with 
 
 
71 Crisis Group interviews, Karachi, August 2016; serving and retired Sindh officials and police 
officers, July-August 2016.  
72 Crisis Group interview, Karachi, July 2016.  
73 Crisis Group telephone interview, Uzma Noorani, rights activist and founding member, Women’s 
Action Forum, a prominent women’s rights organisation, 7 October 2016. Noorani is also general 
secretary of Panah Shelter Home, which supports and shelters rape and domestic violence victims.  
74 Crisis Group interview, Karachi, August 2016. Crisis Group has received from Sindh police offi-
cials, MQM, and human rights advocates but not independently verified extensive documentation, 
including video footage, of extrajudicial/custodial killings.  
75 Maqbool Ahmed, “Operation overkill: how not to improve law and order in Karachi”, Herald, 
October 2015. 
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militants, … an intense battle and exchange of fire in which the militants were 
killed but no injuries were sustained by the police.76 
Another report described how “small villages and half-developed residential neigh-
bourhoods” spread along the 57-km northern bypass, offer “ideal locations to law 
enforcers to kill alleged criminals without being watched by curious human beings”. 
It added: “That almost all these alleged encounters take place at night further dimin-
ishes the possibility of anyone having witnessed them first-hand”.77  
C. Perils of Politicisation  
The choice and timing of arrests by the Rangers often reflect political rather than 
law-and-order concerns. During national by-elections and local polls in 2016, their 
personnel were reportedly inside polling stations to warn voters against supporting 
MQM candidates.78 Yet, the MQM’s victories in those elections, including Waseem 
Akhtar’s as mayor, indicate that it has retained its support base despite, or possibly 
because of, the heavy-handed operation.  
Akhtar was arrested in July 2016, a month before the mayoral election, and 
charged with helping Dr Hussain’s hospital treat terrorists and orchestrating the 
May 2007 political violence in Karachi in which more than 40 were killed.79 Serving 
and retired police, while believing he should be investigated, described the timing as 
politically motivated.80 The MQM leadership also accused the Rangers of harassing 
union councillors, who formed the electoral college for tehsil (town) chair and vice 
chairpersons, inducing them to defect to the Pak Sarzameen Party (PSP) of former 
MQM member and Karachi Mayor Mustafa Kamal. Scores of MQM members have 
reportedly joined the PSP after being released from detention.81  
In August, the Rangers used the opportunity provided by Altaf Hussain’s incen-
diary speech – he called “Pakistan [a] cancer for [the] entire world …, the epicentre 
of terrorism for the entire world” – to raid the MQM’s Nine Zero headquarters, seal 
other party offices and detain leaders and workers, including two legislators. A num-
ber of local party offices were demolished, ostensibly for encroaching on state or pri-
vate property. After the military intensified pressure to remove Altaf from its leader-
ship, the party, in an apparent bid to avoid a ban, first distanced itself from him, then 
reorganised itself under Senator Farooq Sattar. There are now two factions: MQM-
London under the self-exiled Altaf and MQM-Pakistan led by Sattar.82 
 
 
76 Ali Arqam, “Cops or criminals?”, Newsline, July 2016. 
77 Maqbool Ahmed, op. cit. 
78 Crisis Group interview, HRCP, Karachi, August 2016. 
79 On 16 November, Akhtar was released from prison on bail in the last of 39 cases lodged against 
him. “Karachi mayor released from jail after getting bail in last case”, Dawn, 17 November 2016; 
“Scuffles end euphoria over mayor’s release”, The Express Tribune, 17 November 2016. 
80 Crisis Group interviews, Karachi, August 2016.  
81 Crisis Group interviews, MQM leaders, Karachi, July 2016. The PSP was established in March 
2016, allegedly with military support. “Missing MQM workers are being found at PSP offices”, The 
News, 5 August 2016.  
82 Altaf Hussain had also encouraged party activists to attack two media organisations, resulting in 
an attack on the office of the cable television channel, ARY News. He later apologised for his re-
marks. “What Altaf said”, Dawn, 23 August 2016; “I was under severe mental stress: Altaf apologis-
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The Rangers have also continued, as in Dr Hussain’s case, to target the PPP, 
Sindh’s ruling party. In July 2016, they arrested a PPP sympathiser, Asad Kharal, in 
the Larkana district, where they have no policing jurisdiction. He was subsequently 
released, reportedly through the intervention of influential local figures, including 
the brother of PPP Sindh Home Minister Sohail Anwar Siyal. In response, Rangers 
and police surrounded the minister’s residence and arrested scores of people con-
nected to his brother in Larkana. The Rangers rearrested Kharal in Hyderabad, again 
outside their policing jurisdiction.83 The case gave them a pretext to demand prov-
ince-wide powers, arguing the need to be able to pursue suspects who fled Karachi. A 
senior lawyer countered: “Suspects can also flee to southern Punjab or KPK. Are you 
going to follow them there, too?”84 The Sindh government’s rejection of this demand 
has heightened tensions with the military and the paramilitary force.  
Political parties are not the Rangers’ only target. Civil society activists attribute 
harassment of the Fishermen Cooperative Society (FCS) and the Pakistan Fisherfolk 
Forum (PFF), a prominent NGO, to their protests against intimidation of fishermen 
by police and Rangers and moves by the Karachi Cantonment Board to seize coastal 
lands. In June 2015, FCS’s acting chair and two directors were arrested, accused of 
supporting Lyari gangs, terrorism and other criminal activities; in January 2016, the 
Rangers arrested two FCS and PFF officers, including PFF Secretary General Saeed 
Baloch; and in March 2016, they told an anti-terrorism court ex-FCS Chairman 
Nisar Morai was in 90-day preventive detention under the Anti-Terrorism Act.85 
The Rangers’ calculated use of media also underscores the operation’s politicised 
nature. Videotaped confessions of suspects, including Dr Hussain’s apparently when 
in Rangers’ custody, are regularly leaked to the media. Though not admissible in court, 
leaked confessions are aimed at conviction “in the court of public opinion”, said a 
former Sindh police inspector general.86 In August 2016, a National Assembly sub-
committee directed Sindh’s police inspector general to investigate such leaks, using 
Hussain’s as a test case, and to report within three weeks. The police failed to do so, 
saying the Rangers and the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) refused to coop-
erate.87 The Sindh government formally complained about news channels that aired 
 
 
es to military for anti-Pakistan remarks”, Dawn, 23 August 2016; “Key MQM leaders rounded up, 
party offices sealed, bulldozed”, Dawn, 26 August 2016; “MQM distances itself from Altaf Hussain”, 
The News, 23 August 2016; “Government warns MQM to distance itself from Altaf Hussain or suf-
fer consequences”, Dawn, 27 August 2016.  
83 The Rangers, in plain clothes, who arrested Kharal, were detained by police for kidnapping, but 
released after senior officials reached the police station. “Mistaken for kidnappers: Police ‘arrest’ … 
Rangers men to rescue Larkana clerk”, The Express Tribune, 14 July 2016. 
84 Crisis Group interview, Yasin Azad, former Supreme Court Bar Association president, Karachi, 
August 2016; “Rangers arrest Asad Kharal from Hyderabad”, The News, 22 July 2016; “PPP-
Rangers ties hit new low over arrest”, Dawn, 14 July 2016. 
85 Crisis Group interviews, Karachi, July-August 2016. “PFF asks Rangers to review its general sec-
retary’s arrest”, The News, 18 January 2016; “Rangers detain ex-chief of fishermen cooperative for 
90 days”, Dawn, 17 March 2016. 
86 Crisis Group interview, Karachi, August 2016. 
87 “Rangers, NAB not cooperating with police over Dr. Asim video, committee told”, Dawn, 30 Au-
gust 2016. NAB also had Hussain in its custody for a period. 
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the videos to the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA). “The 
media trial is one of the tools of this operation”, MQM’s Sattar said.88 
D. Corruption Allegations 
There are widespread allegations of Ranger corruption, from bribery and extortion 
to control over and extraction of valuable resources. According to PPP Senator Taj 
Haider, “70,000 people were officially arrested in [the second half of 2015]. Most 
have been released. No release comes without a price”.89 During Ramadan in 2016, 
according to locals, some 500-600 youths were apprehended; half were released 
after paying heavy bribes, but those who could not afford to do so remained in cus-
tody.90 A prominent academic said the Rangers were de facto above the law: “The 
MQM’s power to extort has been taken, but has it been replaced? The Rangers, un-
like the MQM, cannot really be tried”.91 There are also widespread reports that police 
benefit from the Rangers’ operation. In some cases, for example in a Baldia town 
market, vendors reportedly pay much more to the police than previously to MQM 
extortionists and to more individuals.92 A journalist covering the area said, “what 
used to be a monthly rate has become a weekly rate”.93  
More significant than petty bribery and extortion are institutional demands on 
Karachi and Sindh resources. A former senior home ministry official, still serving 
when the operation began, said the Rangers “keep blackmailing the government for 
bigger budgets, higher salaries, more vehicles, better schools and health care for 
their families”. A journalist added: “The Rangers have increased their stakes in the 
more lucrative items like real estate and water”.94 They have taken over heritage sites 
such as the Jinnah Courts, where they began building a temporary headquarters in 
2015 without a Sindh culture department committee’s approval. Another heritage 
site, the Meetha Ram Hostel, first occupied in 1992, has officially become a “sub-jail” 
for those they deem too dangerous to mix with regular prisoners. In November 2015, 
they moved personnel into another historic structure, the Radio Pakistan building, 
avowedly to monitor security during Muharram, the Shia month of mourning, but 
they have since established an apparently long-term presence.95  
 
 
88 Crisis Group interview, Karachi, July 2016. PEMRA was established by the Musharraf regime in 
2002 to regulate private television and radio outlets. 
89 Crisis Group interview, Karachi, August 2016. 
90 Crisis Group interviews, local civil society representatives and other residents, Orangi Town, 
Karachi, August 2016. 
91 Crisis Group interview, Karachi, July 2016. 
92 Recipients are said to include the station house office (SHO), traffic police, superintendent of po-
lice and others. Crisis Group interviews, vendors, Baldia Town, Karachi, July 2016; Arqam, “Cops 
or Criminals”, op. cit.  
93 Crisis Group interview, Karachi, July 2016.  
94 Crisis Group interviews, Karachi, July 2016. 
95 Sindh’s then secretary for culture, reportedly transferred for resisting the plan, later said the 
Rangers’ “modus operandi” was to “occupy a heritage building on the pretext of controlling the law 
and order situation but eventually move in. They don’t have the legal authority to move inside these 
buildings … but who can question them?” Built in 1932-1933, the Jinnah Court is protected under 
the Sindh Cultural Heritage Act (1994). “Laying waste to a heritage site – Meetha Ram Hostel”, 
Dawn, 9 July 2016; “Historic Radio Pakistan building, change of guard?”, Dawn, 6 November 
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First given control in 1999 as part of a “water crisis management plan” of the nine 
hydrants maintained by the Karachi Water and Sewage Board (KWSB), the Rangers 
continue to control much of the city’s supply. The hydrants are meant to provide a 
free supply to water-deficient areas, with the rest sold to businesses and other con-
sumers at fixed rates via tankers. The Rangers charge the tanker suppliers a fixed-
per-gallon sum higher for industrial than residential use. Allegedly, the suppliers, in 
collusion with some Rangers, siphon off over 40 per cent to sell at inflated rates.96  
E. Selective Targeting: Jihadist Networks 
The Rangers’ operation has targeted some al-Qaeda-linked sectarian jihadists and 
included the capture of LeJ provincial chief Naeem Bukhari. There have also been 
some raids in Ittehad Town, known as a LeJ safe haven.97 However, prominent ji-
hadists such as Aurangzeb Farooqi, leader of Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ, the 
renamed Sunni extremist Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, SSP), who regularly incites vio-
lence against Shias, and has even been charged with murdering Shias, remain free.98 
A leading academic and civil society activist asked: “What signal does it send when you 
say you’ve arrested [Karachi mayor] Waseem Akhtar but not Aurangzeb Farooqi?” A 
major monthly publication noted, “Areas around Gulshan-e-Bihar, Islam Chowk and 
Iqbal Market are infested with ASWJ flags and graffiti. Attempts by the MQM work-
ers to remove these … led to armed encounters and retaliatory attacks resulting in 
killings on both sides, with the MQM bearing the brunt”.99  
The return of sectarian violence in Karachi shows how sectarian jihadists, facing 
partial action at best, can reorganise and renew attacks against minority communi-
ties. In early October 2016 at least one child was killed and seven women wounded 
at a Liaqatabad Shia mosque; in the last week of October, five were killed and several 
wounded in an attack on a Shia religious gathering in Nazimabad. In apparent retal-
iation, six were killed, including two ASWJ prayer leaders, in the Patel Para area and 
North Nazimabad on 4 November. An editorial in a major daily noted:  
 
 
2015; “‘Illegal construction’ under way at Jinnah Courts”, Dawn, 24 May 2015; “Meetha Ram Hos-
tel to house ‘dangerous’ prisoners”, Dawn, 16 April 2015. 
96 Crisis Group Report, Policing Urban Violence, op. cit. 
97 “‘Airport-like terrorism plot foiled’, 11 suspects held in Karachi”, Dawn, 22 January 2016; “Five 
LeJ suspects arrested in Karachi”, Dawn, 29 December 2014. 
98 As Shia-Sunni tensions escalated in Karachi, Farooqi said his task was the “Sunni awakening … I 
will make Sunnis so powerful against Shias that no Sunni will even want to shake hands with one .… 
They will die on their own; we won’t even have to kill them”. “Insight: Spiral of Karachi killings 
widens Pakistan’s sectarian divide”, Reuters, 24 February 2013. Banned in January 2002, the SSP 
changed its name to Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), though Farooqi acknowledged that his 
organisation was still the SSP. “Only the name was banned”, he said. “Escalation”, The Economist, 
1 December 2012. 
99 Crisis Group interview, Karachi, August 2016; Ali Arqam, “Virus of the mind”, Newsline, May 2016. 
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The state’s response to … sectarian militancy has been dismal … “banned” outfits 
have operated with ease, [highlighting need to] end … recurring cycles of sectari-
an violence …. The state must permanently dismantle outfits that provide the 
ideological and material support for violence.100  
Well-informed sources maintain that many jihadist masterminds had fled Karachi 
by September 2013, anticipating the Rangers’ operation, but may have returned, giv-
en Rangers’ inaction. Elected representatives, senior officials, journalists and civil 
society activists say the Rangers have spared many areas in Karachi and its outskirts 
of the city, known as hubs of “good” jihadists like LeT/JD and Jaish-e-Mohammed. 
“There are pockets all along the Super Highway of ‘good Taliban’”, said a senior PPP 
leader. FIF, LeT/JD’s charity front, still runs its ambulance service in Gulshan-i-
Iqbal. “Any time Pakistan-India or Kashmir tensions flare, these groups mobilise in 
the heart of the city”, said a recently retired senior provincial official. “You can’t treat 
[LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed] as your friends in one part of the country and your 
enemies elsewhere”. A senior police officer, implicitly referring to difficulty in ad-
dressing state-supported jihadists, said, “we tend to look at law and order challenges 
in isolation; we can’t. We have to also look at [them] in the context of our foreign 
policy choices”.101  
Prominent pro-jihadist madrasas continue to operate freely, including the Jamia 
Uloom Islamia in Binori Town, a fountainhead of Deobandi militancy countrywide 
that maintains close ties to Jaish-e-Mohammed; the SITE-based Jamia Binoria; and 
the Jamia Darul Uloom madrasa in Korangi, whose leaders, the Usmani brothers, 
have links to jihadist organisations.102 In May 2016, the Sindh Rangers’ director gen-
eral visited the latter, meeting administrators and scholars, including the Usmani 
brothers. According to a senior international police officer who works closely with 
Karachi law enforcement agencies, “this was an important signal [to the madrasa]. 
The message was, ‘We won’t touch you guys’”.103  
 
 
100 “Karachi sectarian attacks”, editorial, Dawn, 6 November 2016; “Two prayer leaders among six 
killed in sectarian attacks within an hour”, The News, 5 November 2016; “Five killed, several injured 
in sectarian attack on Nazimabad majlis”, The Express Tribune, 29 October 2016. 
101 Crisis Group interviews, Karachi, July-August 2016. Pakistan’s relations with India have deterio-
rated since the January 2016 attack, allegedly by Jaish-e-Mohammed, on an airbase in India’s Pun-
jab state; and the July 2016 killing of a Kashmiri militant commander in Indian-administered Kash-
mir by Indian soldiers, sparking ongoing violent confrontations between protestors and security forc-
es. In January 2017, LeT/JD chief Hafiz Saeed was put under house arrest, with no charges filed, 
similar to the action taken in 2008, when he was held for a year. If banned, the LeT/JD reportedly 
intends to operate under yet another name, Tehreek-e-Azadi Jammu and Kashmir (Kashmir Free-
dom Movement). Saeed’s detention, along with four others, reportedly came in response to concerns 
from the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) about LeT/JD’s unchecked activities and 
finances, which Pakistan formally responded to on 31 January. APG, a 41-member international 
body, monitors enforcement of international standards against money laundering and terrorist fi-
nancing. “Act against JuD or face sanctions, U.S. tells Pakistan”, The News, 30 January 2017.  
102 Crisis Group interviews, senior police officers, Karachi, July-August 2016. Also, Crisis Group 
report, Karachi’s Madrasas, op. cit. 
103 Crisis Group interview, Karachi, May 2016. While there was limited newspaper reporting of this 
event, some private cable television channels covered it, including the Karachi-based Abb Takk news 
channel. http://abbtakk.tv/en/130936-2dg-rangers-sindh-major-gen-bilal-visits-darul-uloom-karachi 
120516.  
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In some neighbourhoods, such as Qasba Colony, where madrasa and mosque 
leaders exercise enormous influence, pro-jihadist seminaries and mosques continue 
to operate. A well-informed observer said, “the Friday sermons alone could be the 
basis for a crackdown”. Complaints to police or other officials seldom yield sustained 
action. Residents’ complaints about mosque and madrasa encroachment on public 
lands, including parks, are similarly ignored.104 Regulating the madrasa sector and 
comprehensive action against those with jihadist links would be fundamental to sus-
tained progress against jihadist violence, radicalisation and recruitment in Karachi.  
 
 
104 He added that local enterprises such as hotels and small businesses practically require prior ap-
proval, “virtually NOCs [no objection certificates]” from these preachers to operate. Crisis Group 
interview, Karachi, August 2016 
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V. Reversing the Decline 
A.  Political Reconciliation 
Comprehensive reforms to reverse Karachi’s decline will require, first, a comprehen-
sive and sustained dialogue between the main political players, the PPP and MQM, 
but also the ANP, which have an interest in recovering political and governing space 
ceded to the military establishment. The technical fixes explored below are unachiev-
able without a basic reconciliation between the three parties, driven by self-interest. 
There are precedents, most notably the Charter of Democracy through which the 
PPP and PML-N, historically bitter national rivals, established in 2006 – a period of 
military rule that threatened their cohesion, if not their survival – and have since ob-
served basic rules of the democratic game in Islamabad. In Karachi, the PPP, MQM 
and ANP leaderships must also rein in violent party activists and ensure that lower 
cadres do not subvert their accord, something they failed to do after the June-July 
2011 agreements to renounce violent politics, discussed above. Institutionalised reg-
ular inter-party talks would also help build trust.  
As the party in office in Sindh, the PPP must seize the initiative. Soon after assum-
ing office in July 2016, Sindh Chief Minister Murad Ali Shah ordered police to release 
six MQM workers and reportedly warned the force against detaining innocent peo-
ple.105 Such gestures could help bridge the PPP-MQM divide, while also heralding 
the provincial government’s commitment to rule of law. However, the government’s 
18 January extension of the Rangers’ mandate, apparently to ease military pressure 
on the PPP and its leadership, undermines the prospects of a reconciliation that is 
essential if the province and its capital are to stabilise.106  
The PPP and MQM and also the ANP should learn from earlier mistakes and 
abandon an approach that undermines not only civilian authority, but also their 
standing with constituents. “The political parties aren’t looking at this in terms of the 
big picture. They’re thinking about what they can get out of this”, said a former cabi-
net-rank adviser to the Sindh government.107 All three have at times supported the 
Rangers operation for short-term political gain, opposing it only when it has adversely 
affected their parties and allies. The MQM, now on the receiving end of Rangers 
abuses, even held a “Solidarity Rally with Defenders of Pakistan against Taliban” in 
Karachi in February 2014. The central ANP leadership is severely critical of the deci-
sion to empower the Rangers, but its Sindh president, Shahi Syed, advocates a con-
tinued operation “until the last terrorist”.108  
Sindh’s political stakeholders should abjure politics of expediency that only height-
en the risk of a destabilising confrontation. Restoring peace in Pakistan’s largest city 
depends on the major parties, particularly the MQM and PPP, reestablishing the basic 
rules of the game: respect for each other’s mandate, observing separation of provin-
 
 
105 “Six Muttahida workers released after CM’s warning”, Dawn, 19 August 2016. 
106 “PPP not to take extreme step over Rangers extension”, The News, 27 December 2015; “Policy of 
cooperation: Sindh grants one-year extension to Rangers”, The Express Tribune, 18 July 2015. 
107 Crisis Group interview, Kaiser Bengali, Karachi, August 2016. 
108 Crisis Group interview, Karachi, August 2016; “MQM shows solidarity with armed forces”, The 
Express Tribune, 24 February 2014. 
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cial and municipal functions via credible, accountable devolution; and ensuring 
equitable provincial and local governance free of patronage and exclusion. 
B. Addressing the Drivers of Instability 
The numbers game of those arrested and killed and even the reduction of targeted 
killings and other organised criminal activity constitute too narrow a barometer with 
which to assess success or failure in addressing the drivers of Karachi’s myriad con-
flicts. Labour movement leader Karamat Ali asked: “If 400 fewer people a month are 
getting killed, that’s good; but have the lives of the millions who live in Karachi im-
proved?” PPP Senator Taj Haider identified two main, related challenges: managing 
the extensive migration and providing job opportunities, both of which “no paramili-
tary operation can solve”.109 Though alienation of unemployed youths does not nec-
essarily lead to jihadist recruitment on ideological grounds, well-funded jihadist 
organisations in Karachi easily find recruits among young men who have no other 
way to make a living. For many with few other prospects, jihad is a job.110 
Karachi’s capacity to absorb the growing labour force, even with high infrastruc-
ture growth and construction, is changing fast. Mechanisation and automation are 
reducing demand for labour in factories and such activities as road building. Many 
factories have closed because of years of power outages that impeded them from 
meeting export order deadlines, with the business moving to competitors in Bangla-
desh, Vietnam and elsewhere. Many producers have shifted factories to lower-wage 
countries such as Sri Lanka; others now use contract workers rather than permanent 
hires.111  
Services are also increasingly shifting to the informal sector, which maintains a 
high demand for low-skilled workers but pays lower salaries with fewer entitlements 
and offers significantly less job security. Better labour laws are certainly needed, but 
local skills and training are not meeting changing demands and must be addressed. 
While there are some donor-funded non-governmental initiatives to fill this gap, they 
are “but a drop in the ocean”.112 State-led efforts could include reviving two mori-
bund government-run polytechnics and adding additional ones, as well as giving the 
private sector incentives to create vocational training institutions. These should em-
phasise technical skills, including operating automated production lines in the heavy 
machinery, steel, chemicals and other key industries and in high-value-added service 
industries like computer technology and business process outsourcing. 
To ensure that Karachi’s unemployed and underemployed do not succumb to the 
lure of groups that advocate violence, the state must resume its role as a service pro-
vider and facilitator rather than a largely absentee regulator. The provincial govern-
ment should prioritise raising and reallocating resources to reverse the decay of state 
 
 
109 Crisis Group interviews, Karachi, August 2016. 
110 Crisis Group interviews, law-enforcement officials, civil society activists, Karachi, July, August 
2016. “Profiling the Violence in Karachi”, Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, July-September 2009; 
“Jihadi encroachment threatens Karachi”, LJWorld, 8 May 2009. 
111 “Half a million jobs lost as textile crisis hits Pakistan’s economy”, Bloomberg, 21 September 
2016; “Impacts of economic crises and reform on the informal textile industry in Karachi”, working 
paper, International Institute for Environment and Development, 2015.  
112 Crisis Group interview, urban planner Arif Hassan, Karachi, July 2016. 
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welfare institutions and to reorient them toward serving low-income groups. For this 
to happen, the PPP and MQM will need to favour equitable service delivery and gov-
ernance, both municipal and provincial, over the politics of patronage.  
Besides reviving public transport and breaking up the transport mafia’s monopoly, 
steps should be taken to provide affordable housing to Karachi’s lower-income 
groups. Civil society initiatives like the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in the congested 
Orangi settlement, Karachi’s largest katchi abadi, and government schemes such as 
the Khuda Ki Basti (God’s Settlements) project of the Hyderabad Development Au-
thority (HDA) could help. The latter scheme was based on “land delivery and devel-
opment models that could overcome the constraints faced by public sector policies in 
serving the shelter needs of the lower-income groups …”.113 HDA willingness to relax 
convoluted rules and regulations and overcome government agency prejudices 
against the urban poor was a significant factor in its success. To provide low-income 
groups affordable housing and shelter on a citywide scale, the provincial government 
should revitalise the Karachi Development Authority (KDA) and coordinate it with 
other government departments, entrepreneurs and civil society actors.  
C. Restoring the Rule of Law 
Since the 2008 democratic transition, the political leadership has acted to reinforce 
and expand legal protections for citizens, including giving constitutional cover to the 
right to fair trial.114 But several measures have also been introduced at the federal 
level, on counter-terrorism grounds and often under military pressure, that dilute 
this right. These include amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act to allow 90-day re-
mands without charge, the Protection of Pakistan Act (POPA, which expired in July 
2016 and was not renewed) and military courts, set up under the 21st constitutional 
amendment (January 2015), the tenure of which expired at the end of 2016.115  
The federal government and parliament have not extended these special measures, 
but on 9 January, the government initiated parliamentary consultations toward re-
viving the military courts. The parliamentary opposition is resisting – and should 
continue to resist – that effort.116 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s national govern-
ment, too, should acknowledge that the military court system, which was reluctantly 
created through the 21st constitutional amendment after parliament succumbed to 
military pressure following the December 2014 Peshawar Army School attack, will 
not pay counter-terrorism dividends. By undermining due process and violating the 
constitutional right to fair trial, military courts are fuelling alienation that will only 
benefit jihadist spoilers.117 As a first step, the federal government and parliament 
 
 
113 Hyderabad is Sindh’s second largest city. Initially focused on sanitation, OPP was expanded to 
include provision of low-cost housing, education, health services and access to credit. Akbar Zaidi, 
“From the lane to the city: the impact of Orangi Pilot Project’s low-cost sanitation model”, Water 
Aid, June 2001; Arif Hassan, “Evaluation of the HDA’s Khuda Ki Basti incremental housing scheme”, 
commissioned by the House Building Finance Corporation, 22 July 1990. The OPP also works on 
sanitation in the Orangi settlement.  
114 This was included in the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act (2010).  
115 Crisis Group Report, Revisiting Counter-Terrorism Strategies, op. cit. 
116 “Opp tells govt to clarify why it wants military courts back”, The Daily Times, 11 January 2017. 
117 Crisis Group Report, Revisiting Counter-Terrorism Strategies, op. cit. 
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should not extend these special measures but commit instead to strengthening rather 
than bypassing regular rule-of-law agencies and institutions.  
Karachi’s police force is woefully under-resourced. Stations in neighbourhoods of 
high militant, sectarian and criminal violence such as Pirabad and Orangi are some 
of the worst off. Officers are frequently transferred, often within weeks or months, 
including those involved in investigating jihadist and criminal networks. A May 2016 
Sindh apex meeting, presided over by the chief minister, approved recruitment of an 
additional 20,000 police, including 8,000 for Karachi, but the army is to train them. 
PPP Senator Haider believed that the additional numbers in Karachi “would make us 
self-sufficient and reduce dependence on the Rangers”.118 Yet, a more militarised po-
lice would likely be counterproductive and could emulate Rangers reliance on brute 
and lethal force, as has happened in Punjab.119  
Better performance, moreover, depends not only on more police on the streets or 
more stations, but also on fundamental reorientation toward investigation that re-
duces physical deployment and results in the trained detective’s ascendency over the 
watchman. Technological enhancement is also needed, including by establishing, 
training and properly resourcing specialists who could, for example, oversee CCTV 
footage and keep databases. Other specialists should be trained to analyse the collat-
ed data. A modern criminal justice system, including a better resourced and trained 
prosecution service and adequate protection of witnesses, investigators, prosecutors 
and judges, is essential to sustained, credible action against criminal and jihadist 
leaders, operatives and organisations that ends not with arrests and raids but court 
convictions.120 
Depolitisation of the police is equally urgent. The Sindh government should 
acknowledge that a deeply politicised force will remain incapable of enforcing the 
state’s writ, leaving the military and Rangers to present themselves as the only viable 
law-enforcement alternative. As a first step, a new police order from the provincial 
government should replace the 1861 Police Act, using the 2002 Police Order as a tem-
plate, to guarantee operational autonomy and robust internal and external commu-
nity-led accountability.121 
 
 
118 Crisis Group interview, Karachi, August 2016. “Sindh police to hire 20,000 army-trained cops”, 
The Express Tribune, 12 May 2016. Apex committees are provincial bodies, established under the 
National Action Plan (but with no statutory mandate), to oversee counter-terrorism policy imple-
mentation. Each is headed by the provincial chief minister and includes provincial bureaucrats, 
senior military officials and representatives from military and civilian intelligence agencies. See Cri-
sis Group Report, Revisiting Counter-Terrorism Strategies, op. cit. 
119 Crisis Group Report, Pakistan’s Jihadist Heartland, op. cit. 
120 See, Crisis Group Reports, Revisiting Counter-Terrorism Strategies; Policing Urban Violence; 
Reforming Pakistan’s Criminal Justice System; and Reforming Pakistan’s Police, all op. cit. 
121 The 1861 act, based on the Irish Constabulary model, turned the police in British India into a 
coercive arm of the state under the bureaucracy’s control. Police Order 2002 envisioned an auton-
omous force, independent of bureaucratic/political interference, and answerable to elected and 
community representatives. Many key provisions were never enforced and/or were diluted through 
2004 amendments by General Musharraf’s rubber stamp parliament. This police order’s validity 
expired on 31 December 2009, giving provincial governments the authority to create their own po-
licing systems. The Sindh government revived the 1861 act in 2011. Crisis Group Reports, Policing 
Urban Violence; and Reforming Pakistan’s Police, both op. cit. 
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The judiciary’s role in reining in law enforcement excesses is just as crucial. 
Judges have taken occasional action, such as an April 2016 Sindh High Court (SHC) 
order for police to register a case for a “staged encounter” against Malir’s senior 
superintendent of police, widely accused of extrajudicial killings.122 However, most 
retired judges, lawyers and rights activists believe that Sindh’s higher judiciary is un-
likely to be proactive against human rights violations.123 Referring to the June 2016 
kidnapping of the SHC chief justice’s advocate son, a human rights lawyer said, “when 
Awais [Shah] disappeared, we told the chief justice, ‘Now you understand how seri-
ous this is’. But we should be concerned about all such instances, not just when it’s a 
high-profile case”.124  
“The judiciary is responsible for the militarisation of justice”, said a retired senior 
judge, referring to the Supreme Court’s August 2015 split decision validating the 21st 
amendment and its military court system.125 “But the politicians are primarily re-
sponsible”, he added. “The mere passing of the amendment was a slap in the face of 
the judiciary”.126 The amendment’s two-year sunset clause implied that the military 
courts were a stopgap to address a national security crisis. Yet, neither the federal 
nor Sindh provincial government has used the intervening period to improve the 
criminal justice system.  
Karachi accounts for 80 per cent of the backlog in Sindh courts. The 58 addition-
al courts set up since 2015 lack adequate facilities.127 As with the police, however, re-
solving the backlog depends not on bricks and mortar, but on ensuring that judges 
are well trained and responsive, guarantee citizens’ right to a fair trial and deliver 
justice to victims and their families. It is urgent to begin working toward those objec-
tives instead of reverting to a system – military courts – that has undermined rather 
than improved the rule of law. Ultimately, the judicial accountability buck stops at 
the SHC, which must more robustly uphold citizens’ rights and liberties and monitor 
and oversee lower-court performance.  
 
 
122 “SHC orders FIR against SSP RAO Anwar over ‘staged encounter’”, Dawn, 16 April 2016. 
123 Crisis Group interviews, Karachi, August 2016. 
124 Crisis Group interview, Karachi, August 2016. Shah was freed in July 2016. 
125 The decision is at www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/Const.P.12of2010.pdf. 
126 Crisis Group interview, Karachi, August 2016. 
127 Crisis Group interviews, lawyers, retired and serving judges, Karachi, July 2016; “58 new courts 
planned, says SHC judge”, Dawn, 8 March 2015. 
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VI. Conclusion  
Though Karachi has long been the engine of Pakistan’s economic growth, the state 
has not developed an administrative structure to govern a modern metropolis. Ser-
vice delivery has instead generally yielded to ethno-political rivalries, and the links 
between local, provincial and federal authority continue to fray. The Rangers opera-
tion is incapable of delivering the necessary political solutions to the city’s challenges, 
and politicisation and abuse of power are further aggravating tensions.  
Among Karachi’s most significant long-term governance challenges are the inter-
linked issues of a rapidly growing population – due to both internal growth and 
migration, including of Pashtuns, Sindhis and Southern Punjabi Seraiki speakers – 
and the Sindh government’s inability to provide basic goods, services and security. 
Whether these demographic shifts will contribute to the economy or widen political 
divisions depends on the state’s role and the political players’ choices. 
Municipal, provincial and federal institutions will have to assume a more direct 
and vigorous role in levelling the playing field. Rather than subjecting Karachi to a 
highly distorted market, they must commit to an equitable distribution of basic re-
sources such as land, water and transport, while clamping down on the mafias that 
exploit them. Creating job opportunities and access to justice is also essential if 
Karachi’s disenfranchised youth is to be prevented from succumbing to the lure of 
criminal gangs and sectarian and jihadist spoilers.  
While Sindh’s superior judiciary should be proactive in ensuring justice is done 
and abusers are held to account, Karachi’s main political stakeholders, the PPP and 
MQM, are central to defusing growing tensions, preventing conflict and creating the 
conditions in which institutional reforms can be debated, agreed on and implement-
ed. They need to overcome decades of often violent hostility and opt for political 
compromises and workable solutions that protect and benefit citizens and stabilise 
the city. Otherwise, they risk losing yet more ground to the military, and the law-and-
order crisis will likely worsen. The debate on extending the Rangers’ mandate will 
begin again in April, after the expiry of the current 90-day term. Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif’s federal government should realise that retaining the force in Karachi 
at the cost of Sindh’s regular law-enforcement apparatus would fail to stabilise Paki-
stan’s economic hub and could further undermine civilian authority in the midst of a 
fragile democratic transition. 
Karachi/Islamabad/Brussels, 15 February 2017  
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Appendix C: Glossary 
ANP – Awami National Party, a secular 
Pashtun-dominated party that won Sindh 
provincial assembly seats from Karachi for  
the first time in 2008. 
ASWJ – Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat, the renamed 
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), an extremist 
Deobandi group, the parent organisation of the 
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (see below). 
CTD – Counter-Terrorism Department, the lead 
investigation and civilian counter-terrorism 
provincial-level agency, earlier named Criminal 
Investigation Department.  
DHA – Defense Housing Authority, an autono-
mous body, managed by a military-dominated 
governing body, that controls and manages land 
in cantonment areas, including some of Kara-
chi’s most affluent neighbourhoods.  
FATA – Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 
comprising seven administrative districts, or 
agencies, and six Frontier Regions bordering on 
south-eastern Afghanistan. 
FIA – Federal Investigation Agency. 
FIF – Falah-i-Insaniyat Foundation, a charity 
front of the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (see below).  
FCS – Fishermen Cooperative Society. 
HAD – Hyderabad Development Authority. 
HRCP – The independent non-governmental 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. 
ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence directorate,  
the military’s main intelligence agency. 
JD – Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the renamed Lashkar-e-
Tayyaba (see below). 
Katchi abadi – Squatter settlement. 
KDA – Karachi Development Authority.  
KECS – Karachi Electric Supply Company. 
KMC – Karachi Municipal Corporation. 
KPT – Karachi Port Trust. 
KPK – Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, formerly known as 
the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP).  
LeJ – Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, an extremist 
Deobandi organisation, responsible for major 
sectarian killings and other terrorist violence, 
headquartered in Punjab but with a countrywide 
network. 
LeT – Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, anti-India jihadi 
group led by Hafez Saeed, banned and 
renamed Jamaat-ud-Dawa in 2002, responsible 
for the November 2008 Mumbai attacks.  
MQM – Muttahida Qaumi Movement, Karachi’s 
most powerful political party, previously the 
Mohajir Quami Movement. 
Mohajir – Urdu-speaking migrants and their 
descendants are known as Mohajirs (literal 
translation: refugees). 
NAB – National Accountability Bureau. 
NAP – National Action Plan, to counter 
terrorism and extremism, formulated in 
December 2014 in response to the December 
attack on Peshawar’s Army Public School.  
OPP – Orangi Pilot Project, an NGO-led 
program working on the delivery of social 
development, health, housing, education and 
micro-credit in Orangi Town’s katchi abadis. 
PAC – People’s Aman (Peace) Committee, a 
Baloch-dominated criminal gang that emerged 
in Karachi’s Lyari neighbourhood in 2008.  
PFF – Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum.  
PML-N – Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz,  
led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, currently 
heading a majority government at the centre 
and in Punjab. 
PPP – Pakistan Peoples Party, founded by 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1967, heads the Sindh 
provincial government. 
PSP – Pak Sarzameen Party, a Karachi-based 
political party established in March 2016 by 
former MQM senior member and Karachi Mayor 
Mustafa Kamal. 
PTI – Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf. 
SHC – Sindh High Court. 
SSP – Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, a radical 
Deobandi group and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi’s parent 
organisation; renamed Ahle Sunnat Wal 
Jamaat.  
TTP – Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban 
Movement of Pakistan), also known as the 
Pakistani Taliban.
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The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisa-
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Special Reports 
Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic 
State, Special Report, 14 March 2016 (also 
available in Arabic). 
Seizing the Moment: From Early Warning to Ear-
ly Action, Special Report N°2, 22 June 2016. 
North East Asia 
Old Scores and New Grudges: Evolving Sino-
Japanese Tensions, Asia Report N°258, 24 
July 2014 (also available in Chinese). 
Risks of Intelligence Pathologies in South Korea, 
Asia Report N°259, 5 August 2014. 
Stirring up the South China Sea (III): A Fleeting 
Opportunity for Calm, Asia Report N°267, 7 
May 2015 (also available in Chinese). 
North Korea: Beyond the Six-Party Talks, Asia 
Report N°269, 16 June 2015. 
Stirring up the South China Sea (IV): Oil in 
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Sri Lanka’s Presidential Election: Risks and Op-
portunities, Asia Briefing N°145, 9 December 
2014. 
Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis, Asia Re-
port N°264, 9 February 2015. 
Women, Violence and Conflict in Pakistan, Asia 
Report, N°265, 8 April 2015.  
The Future of the Afghan Local Police, Asia Re-
port N°268, 4 June 2015. 
Revisiting Counter-terrorism Strategies in Paki-
stan: Opportunities and Pitfalls, Asia Report 
N°271, 22 July 2015. 
Sri Lanka Between Elections, Asia Report 
N°272, 12 August 2015. 
Winning the War on Polio in Pakistan, Asia Re-
port N°273, 23 October 2015. 
Nepal’s Divisive New Constitution: An Existential 
Crisis, Asia Report N°276, 4 April 2016. 
Political Conflict, Extremism and Criminal Jus-
tice in Bangladesh, Asia Report N°277, 11 
April 2016. 
Sri Lanka: Jumpstarting the Reform Process, 
Asia Report N°278, 18 May 2016. 
Pakistan’s Jihadist Heartland: Southern Punjab, 
Asia Report N°279, 30 May 2016. 
South East Asia 
Myanmar’s Military: Back to the Barracks?, Asia 
Briefing N°143, 22 April 2014 (also available in 
Burmese). 
Counting the Costs: Myanmar’s Problematic 
Census, Asia Briefing N°144, 15 May 2014 
(also available in Burmese). 
Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State, Asia 
Report N°261, 22 October 2014 (also availa-
ble in Burmese). 
A Coup Ordained? Thailand’s Prospects for 
Stability, Asia Report N°263, 3 December 
2014. 
Myanmar’s Electoral Landscape, Asia Report 
N°266, 28 April 2015 (also available in Bur-
mese). 
Southern Thailand: Dialogue in Doubt, Asia Re-
port N°270, 8 July 2015. 
Myanmar’s Peace Process: A Nationwide 
Ceasefire Remains Elusive, Asia Briefing 
N°146, 16 September 2015 (also available in 
Burmese). 
The Myanmar Elections: Results and Implica-
tions, Asia Briefing N°147, 9 December 2015 
(also available in Burmese). 
Thailand’s Lengthening Roadmap to Elections, 
Asia Report N°274, 10 December 2015. 
The Philippines: Renewing Prospects for Peace 
in Mindanao, Asia Report N°281, 6 July 2016. 
Myanmar’s New Government: Finding Its Feet?, 
Asia Report N°282, 29 July 2016 (also availa-
ble in Burmese). 
Southern Thailand’s Peace Dialogue: No Trac-
tion, Asia Briefing N°148, 21 September 2016.  
Myanmar’s Peace Process: Getting to a Political 
Dialogue, Asia Briefing N°149, 19 October 
2016 (also available in Burmese). 
Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine 
State, Asia Report N°283, 15 December 2016 
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